Global Health Impact: A Basis for Labeling and Licensing Campaigns? by Hassoun, Nicole
Binghamton University
The Open Repository @ Binghamton (The ORB)
Philosophy Faculty Scholarship Philosophy
2012
Global Health Impact: A Basis for Labeling and
Licensing Campaigns?
Nicole Hassoun
Binghamton University--SUNY, nhassoun@binghamton.edu
Follow this and additional works at: https://orb.binghamton.edu/philosophy_fac
Part of the Philosophy Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Philosophy at The Open Repository @ Binghamton (The ORB). It has been accepted for
inclusion in Philosophy Faculty Scholarship by an authorized administrator of The Open Repository @ Binghamton (The ORB). For more
information, please contact ORB@binghamton.edu.
Recommended Citation
Hassoun, Nicole, "Global Health Impact: A Basis for Labeling and Licensing Campaigns?" (2012). Philosophy Faculty Scholarship. 12.
https://orb.binghamton.edu/philosophy_fac/12
Global Health Impact: 
A Basis for Labeling and Licensing Campaigns?i
I. Introduction
Every year 9 million people are diagnosed with tuberculosis, every day more than 13,400 people 
are infected with AIDS, and every 30 seconds malaria kills a child.ii About a third of all deaths, 18 million a 
year or 50,000 every day, are poverty-related.iii Most of the world’s health problems afflict poor countries 
and their poorest inhabitants.iv There are many reasons why so many people die of poverty-related causes.v 
One reason is that the poor cannot access many of the existing drugs and technologies they need. Another is 
that little of the research and development (R&D) done on new drugs and technologies benefits the poor.  
There are several proposals on the table that might incentivize pharmaceutical companies to extend access 
to essential drugs and technologies to the global poor.vi Still, the problem remains – the poor are suffering 
and dying from lack of access to essential medicines. So, it is worth considering a new alternative. This 
paper suggests rating pharmaceutical and biotechnology companies based on how some of their policies 
impact poor people’s health. It argues that it might be possible to leverage a rating system to encourage 
companies to extend access to essential drugs and technologies to the poor. 
Consider a few possible uses for a rating system that this paper will explore more fully below. One 
possibility is to give the highest rated companies, in given year, a “Global Health Impact” label to use on  
their products. These companies would then have an incentive to use the label to garner a larger share of 
the market as those engaged in trade and investment may prefer to purchase goods and invest in companies 
that help the poor. Other labeling campaigns include Fair Trade, Organic, Ethos, RED, and the Sustainable 
Forestry Initiative.  Having a rating system for pharmaceutical and biotechnology companies would also 
open  the  door  to  all  kinds  of  fruitful  social  activism  including  global  health  licensing  campaigns.  
Pharmaceutical  and  biotechnology  companies  rely,  to  a  large  extent,  on  university  research  and 
development. So, if universities give preference to highly-rated companies in licensing their technology,  
companies will have an incentive to become highly rated. This idea is along the lines of the Universities  
Allied for Access to Essential Medicines licensing campaign. A rating system, even with an associated 
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labeling  and  licensing  campaign,  will  not  solve  all  of  the  poor’s  health  problems.  Nevertheless,  this  
proposal has some advantages over and might be used in conjunction with existing proposals. Together 
they may have a significant impact on access to essential drugs.
II. Creating a Good Rating System
One possible rating system is the recently released Access to Medicine Index publicized by the 
New York Times, which rates companies based on their policies but does not (yet) provide the basis for a 
labeling or licensing campaign.vii The Access to Medicine Index rates companies along several dimensions 
including  their  R&D,  patenting,  pricing,  and  drug  donation  programs.  It  aims  to  improve  access  to 
medicine.viii
Select Access to Medicine Index Ratings
Figure 3. Select Access to Medicines Index Ratingsix
Unfortunately, the Access to Medicine Index has some serious problems. Its ratings are primarily 
subjective and may be unduly influenced by irrelevant information. The index solicits input from many 
“stake-holders” (pharmaceutical companies, doctors, non-governmental organizations etc.) irrespective of 
whether their interests compete with the interests of the poor. It is not clear what impact different interest  
groups have on the final rating. Another problem is that the index gives companies credit just for having 
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good policies  in  place  (more  than  50% of the  original  Index  was  policy-based).  This  is  analogous  to 
rewarding someone based on how they say they are going to carry out a project. As anyone familiar with 
Enron’s official code of ethics knows, good policies do not guarantee good outcomes. 
A better rating system would be objective and output-based.x That is, it would reward companies 
based on how their R&D results and charitable contributions etc. actually impact poor people’s health. It 
would not just reward companies based on the amount of resources they put into creating and helping poor 
people access essential drugs and technologies. Companies rewarded for their investments might make it 
seem like they are investing more in helping the poor than they are.  This is a real  concern given that  
biotechnology and pharmaceutical companies may already be exaggerating their R&D costs.xi Furthermore, 
rewarding investments creates no incentive for companies to be efficient and productive. If what we really  
care about is whether the poor can access essential drugs and technologies, it is probably better to reward  
companies based on how much their policies actually increase access.
To create  an  objective,  output-based  rating system researchers  should  probably look  at  many 
aspects  of companies’  R&D and charitable endeavors.xii Researchers  might  consider,  for instance,  how 
much each company’s charitable contributions are doing for the poor by looking at its a) drug donations, b) 
price reductions, c) approved and verifiable health-projects (e.g. health-related infrastructure improvements 
in  developing  countries),  d) technology  transfer  programs  for  developing  countries  and  e)  efforts  to 
enhance developing countries’ research capacities.xiii The goal would be to measure the number of disability 
adjusted  life-years  (DALYs),  or  whatnot,  companies’  R&D  and  charitable  efforts  are  averting  in 
developing countries.xiv 
Consider here just one way of rating companies’ R&D output.xv It would take a very long time to 
look at all the drugs each company produces, even in a given year. Fortunately, researchers might estimate 
companies’ R&D output by looking at all the US Food and Drug Administration approved "orphan" drugs 
and seeing how much each could alleviate the global burden of disease (GBD). Orphan drugs are those that 
biotechnology and pharmaceutical companies expect (or say they expect) to have very small markets in the 
US.xvi So the drugs and technologies  for  neglected  diseases  that  researchers  would want to incentivize 
companies to produce should be listed as orphan (companies already have incentives to produce drugs and 
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technologies for which there is a large US market).xvii Some orphan drugs will not help the poor and there is 
an incentive for companies to get as many drugs as possible listed as orphan because they get up to a 50% 
tax credit for testing orphan drugs.xviii Researchers might, however, do an effectiveness analysis on orphan 
drugs that address neglected diseases to estimate how much each of these drugs will help the poor. 
Although there are different  ways  of doing effectiveness  analysis  and the calculations can get  
quite complex, the basic idea is simple. First, look at each drug’s market price and the amount of need 
equivalent dosages of each will fulfill  in developing countries (e.g.  in DALYs).xix The amount of need 
equivalent dosages of a drug will fulfill might be calculated using the DALY information in the WHO’s 
Global Burden of Disease study and drug efficacy estimates from clinical trials or meta-analyses of such  
data.xx Suppose of the 34 million DALYs lost to malaria in 2004, 80% can be attributed to plasmodium 
falciparum (the worst kind of malaria).xxi Quinine is effective in about 9% of cases.xxii So, Quinine probably 
averted about 2.5 million DALYs.
The next step is to rate companies on the basis of their inventions’ impact -- aggregating their 
individual inventions’ impacts (in terms of DALYs averted). Suppose Pfizer has three drugs that avert the 
loss of 1.1, 1.5 and 2.1 million DALYs, respectively. Suppose Bayer has two drugs that avert the loss of 2.2 
and 2.4 million DALYs, respectively, Bayer may be ranked above Pfizer. Bayer’s drugs avert 4.7 million 
DALYs, while Pfizer’s avert 4.6 million DALYs. 
There may be good reasons to modify this kind of rating system. To insure that companies do not  
get too much credit for producing slight variations on standard drugs and technologies, it might be good to 
consider how much improvement each drug offers over the next best alternative. xxiii To do this it might 
suffice to simply subtract the expected benefit to the poor of the best old drug or technology from the 
expected benefit  of  the new drug or  technology.xxiv Companies  would, however,  receive  credit  if  their 
products alleviate more disease because they have better pricing strategies, for instance, even if their drugs  
offer no new therapeutic improvements.xxv 
The details of this schema would have to be worked out carefully and might diverge significantly 
from those suggested here. Economic analysis might help maximize the positive impact on the poor. It 
might be more difficult to capture the impact biotechnology and pharmaceutical companies are having on 
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the poor than to create standards for good working conditions as the Workers’ Rights Consortium has tried 
to do. Still, there is a lot of work on effectiveness analysis in the literature.xxvi This work might also provide 
the basis for evaluating companies’ charitable efforts.xxvii
If it is too difficult to find verifiable information on the impact of some of companies’ charitable  
or R&D endeavors, that may not present an insurmountable obstacle for a rating system. It may be possible 
to start with the available information, eliciting more information as a condition of rating companies once 
the system is in place.xxviii Some information is sensitive, but if companies want to compete for ratings, they 
have an incentive to release it. Furthermore, companies may benefit in other ways from providing some of 
this  information  to  the  public.  Perhaps  this  is  why  many  companies  are  already  collaborating  with 
researchers to document their charitable and drug donation programs.xxix 
Another reason for optimism is that, the rating system need not be very precise. It just matters that  
researchers establish a feasible bar over which companies must pass to receive GHI certification and that a  
rating system yields the correct ordinal ranking of companies. So, even if a rating system is initially quite  
imperfect, that may not be a problem. 
It is important, however, that the index encourage companies to make sustainable changes in their 
policies for the long term rather than just pursue policies that pay off in the short term. The idea is to  
reward them for their impact on global health over time. So it is important that the rating system itself is in 
place  for  a  long  time,  and  gives  appropriate  weight  to  rewarding  long term investments  that  actually  
improve poor peoples’ health. 
A  good  rating  system  should  probably  be  developed  and  administered  by  an  appropriately 
impartial  and transparent  rating organization.  Perhaps a non-governmental  group like Doctors  Without 
Borders or the World Health Organization would be willing to develop and oversee such a project. If the 
organization does not have the relevant research capacity, it might partner with academics specializing in 
health evaluation methodologies. Alternately, governments or international organizations might develop the 
rating system and provide the requisite oversight (as the US government does with the USDA Organic label 
and the International Standardization Organization does with the ISO 14000 environmental management 
standards).xxx In either case, however, input from all the relevant stakeholders including biotechnology and 
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pharmaceutical companies may be essential to create a good and sustainable rating system. This will help 
insure that companies get credit for as many of the good things they are doing as possible and may expose  
potential areas of abuse.
Finally,  a good rating organization should probably have a review panel to address unforeseen 
problems as  they arise.  This  panel  can  hear  objections to  allowing a company to receive  credit  for  a 
proposed project and alter the rating system as necessary. xxxi It is impossible to foresee every problem. It 
may also be counter-productive to spend time worrying about problems that may not arise.
III.   Global Health Impact (GHI) Labeling
One  way  of  encouraging  biotechnology  and  pharmaceutical  companies  to  extend  access  to 
essential drugs and technologies to the poor with a rating system like that described above is to create a  
Global Health Impact (GHI) label that they can use on their products. Then, these companies will have an  
incentive to voluntarily use the label to garner a larger share of the market. If Wyeth, for example, was  
highly rated, Wyeth could use the GHI label on Advil. Wyeth would have an incentive to do so because 
consumers  and  doctors  might,  in  some  cases,  prefer  to  purchase  and  prescribe  GHI  Advil  over  the 
alternative analgesics. If even a small percentage of consumers or doctors would prefer GHI products, the 
incentive to use this label for analgesics alone could be significant in this approximately two-billion dollar 
a year market. xxxii (Note: The top ten analgesic pills seem to capture between 2-14% of the market each and 
they are all available over the counter from Walgreens and other pharmacies). xxxiii This proposal might be 
useful wherever there is a market for companies’ products.
It  is  worth  exploring  this  option,  given  the  success  of  other  labeling  campaigns.  Fair  Trade 
campaigns have, for instance, been quite successful. In 2000, European countries sold 27 million pounds of 
coffee worth more than 300 million dollars.xxxiv Fair Trade coffee sales amounted to about 1.2 percent of the 
European market.xxxv About 50,000 retail outlets (97% of roasters) including Starbucks, Peets, and Green 
Mountain coffee sell Fair Trade certified coffee, even Exxon Mobile sells the stuff.xxxvi And it is not just 
coffee. By 2007, Fair Trade certified sales were approximately €2.3 billion.xxxvii RED and Buy Pink – for 
companies willing to donate a portion of the sale of a product to AIDS and breast cancer research – have 
also been quite successful.  RED has provided 150 million dollars to the Global Fund and is one of its 
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largest contributors, for instance.xxxviii USDA Organic label, LEED certification for green buildings, and 
FCS  and  Smart  Wood  Certified  Forestry  sustainable  forestry  labeling  are  likewise  growing.  Ethical  
consumption, supported by such campaigns, is generally on the rise. In the UK, for instance, expenditure on 
ethical  goods  and  services  in  energy,  housing,  household  goods,  transportation,  personal  items,  and 
subscriptions almost doubled between 2002-2007.xxxix
Furthermore, there is reason to think that a GHI label, in particular, could create large incentives 
for positive change.xl One percent of the market in analgesics alone is 20 million dollars.xli Markets for 
other pharmaceutical products are much larger. The US market for prescription allergy medicines in 2001 
alone generated revenues of more than $6.45 billion (1.7 billion came from over the counter allergy and  
asthma products before Claritin, Allegra, and Zyrtec were off prescription).xlii
Patients, doctors, and insurance companies will not always prefer GHI drugs and technologies. 
Sometimes there will be one medicine that is best for a particular condition in which case its GHI status 
may not  matter.  In  many cases  it  would  not  even  be  a  good  idea  for  patients,  doctors,  or  insurance 
companies to choose GHI products if they are not the best choice for a particular disease or disability. 
Many drugs have equally good competitors, however. In 2006, 63% of all prescriptions were for 
generic drugs. When there is an equally good competitor for drugs under patents, patients, doctors, and  
insurance  companies  might  take  the  ratings  into  account.xliii Furthermore,  many  over-the-counter 
medications have equally good competitors. The market for over the counter medicines in 2004, alone, was 
US $16 billion.xliv This market includes many drugs made by major pharmaceutical companies including 
Nicorette, Monistat, and Claritin that have reasonable competitors.
If  generic  companies  were  also  rated  (e.g.  on  the  basis  of  their  drug  donation  programs and 
charitable  contributions)  the  potential  impact  of  GHI  labeling  would  be  even  larger.  The  market  for 
generics is over 20 billion and consumers are often indifferent (or nearly indifferent) between generics and  
other medicines. xlv So the fact that pharmacies usually do not carry more than one generic of the same 
molecule  should  provide  no  objection  to  this  proposal  (people  might  prefer  a  GHI  certified  generic 
medication to its patented competitors). If consumption of GHI goods reached 1% of the market in over-
the-counter and generic medications -- - that would yield at least 3.6 billion dollars worth of incentive for 
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biotechnology and pharmaceutical companies to become GHI certified.xlvi This number looks big enough to 
incentivize even Pfizer to do some good.
Furthermore,  pharmaceutical  companies  make all  kinds of products besides drugs – from diet 
drinks to lotion and pet vitamins to mouth wash. Pfizer, for instance, makes parasiticides, anti-infectives,  
biologicals, allergy, cancer, pain, metabolic disease, production, nutritionals, and food safety products for  
animals. Besides their pain management, dietary supplements, respiratory, topical, and GI medicines for 
people, they have “a full line of infant formulas, follow-on formulas, growing-up milks, and prenatal and  
adult supplements.”xlvii So, they could use the GHI label on these products too.
Finally, insurance companies might create additional incentives for companies to extend access to 
essential drugs and technologies to the poor. Both (public and private) insurance companies could create 
incentive for positive change by giving (some) preference to (otherwise equivalent) GHI drugs on their 
formularies. They might even be encouraged to do so if a similar rating system were designed to measure 
insurance companies’ impact.
Having  different  (e.g.  gold  and silver  star)  labels  might  also help  ensure  that  the  GHI rating 
system does not just “rubber stamp” what may be genuinely bad behavior on the part of biotechnology and 
pharmaceutical  companies.xlviii (Initially,  even the best companies might not be doing enough to extend 
access to essential drugs and technologies to the poor.) 
Even in the absence of a complete account of companies’ obligations or multiple labels, however, 
a GHI rating agency can avoid condoning bad behavior in other ways. Just as it is possible to reward a  
generally  bad  employee  or  child  for  doing  something  right,  it  is  possible  to  reward  a  generally  bad  
company for good behavior. It is just essential that everyone utilizing the GHI label is clear about exactly 
what it does and does not mean.
Although some companies may try to undercut the GHI label or game the system by, for instance,  
lobbying  the  rating  agency  or  creating  counterfeit  labels,  there  are  also  reasons  for  highly  ranked 
companies to support it. If the rating standards are transparent and simple, and consumers and health care 
professionals are educated about the GHI label, it might be widely trusted and alternatives viewed with 
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suspicion.  This  seems to be the  case  with Fair  Trade  labels,  for  instance.xlix Governments  might  even 
regulate use of the label as the US did, however imperfectly, with “Organic” labels.l 
IV.   GHI Licensing
Having a GHI certification system for biotechnology and pharmaceutical companies would also 
open the door to many other  ways  of  incentivizing companies to extend access  to essential  drugs and 
technologies  to  the  poor.  Activists  who  believe  people  have  a  human  right  to  essential  drugs  and 
technologies might, for instance, organize boycotts of non-essential medicines produced by companies that 
are not GHI certified (just like animal rights advocates organized boycotts of tuna caught by companies that 
did not use dolphin safe nets). Alternately, socially responsible investment companies could include in their 
portfolio GHI companies.li Such activism might positively impact the poor’s access to essential drugs and 
technologies. 
GHI might  even  encourage  new kinds of  social  activism. An organization  along the  lines  of 
Universities Allied for Access to Essential Medicines (UAEM), which promotes licensing practices to help  
the poor, might create a campaign to get universities to develop “GHI licensing” policies. lii Alternately, the 
American Medical Student’s Association, which uses metrics to put pressure on pharmaceutical companies  
and universities to improve policies, might launch a GHI licensing campaign. Since UAEM has already had 
some success with getting universities to accept their (very important) Equitable Access License (i.e. open-
access license), there is reason for optimism.liii
Pharmaceutical and biotechnology companies rely, to a large extent, on university research and 
development.  Universities  have  developed  many  drugs  and  technologies  including  vaccines,  tests  for 
osteoporosis  and  breast  cancer,  and  the  “gene  splicing  technology  that  initiated  the  biotechnology 
industry.”liv Many big pharmaceutical companies license in or acquire a large percentage of their drugs (by, 
say, purchasing small biotech companies) from universities. lv “In 2002, for example, Pfizer licensed in 30 
percent of its drugs, and Merck 35 percent.” lvi All of Bristol-Myers Squibbs’ best selling drugs in 2003 
were licensed.lvii Pharmaceutical  companies probably acquire even more of their most innovative drugs 
from universities.lviii “Nearly all HIV/AIDS and cancer drugs are based on outside research -- most of which 
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is university research sponsored by the NIH.”lix In 2000, a US Senate report found that federal  funding 
supported the development of 15 of the 21 most important drugs.lx 
On a conservative estimate,  about a  third of  all  R&D is done by universities in high income  
countries. The percentage may be even greater as companies have a large incentive to over report R&D and 
include marketing costs as R&D.lxi  
Figure 4: R&D in High Income Countrieslxii
This was not so a few years  ago.  In  1980, congress  passed the Bayh-Dole act  which allowed 
universities  to  patent  their  research  and  to  license  it  to  third  parties. lxiii Before  the  act  was  passed, 
universities  received  less  than  250  patents  a  year.  In  1996,  universities  received  over  2,000  patents,  
“executed  nearly  2,200  licensing  agreements,  and  received  royalty  income  from  licensing  of  $242 
million.”lxiv Between 1980-2007, over 1,500 start-up companies were formed from academic research. lxv In 
2005, there were at least 28,349 active licenses.lxvi 
Furthermore, there is reason to believe pharmaceutical companies are coming to rely more and 
more on universities. Recently in-house pharmaceutical research has not been very productive. lxvii In light 
of its dry pipeline, the pharmaceutical industry is “searching ever more desperately for drugs to license 
from small biotechnology companies and universities.”lxviii 
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Because biotechnology and pharmaceutical companies depend to a great  extent on university’s  
licenses,  universities  could,  conceivably,  influence  these  companies’  policies.lxix If,  for  instance, 
universities’  licensing agreements  required  preferential  treatment  of  companies  that  were  highly rated, 
companies would have an incentive to meet GHI standards. lxx Universities might adopt a GHI licensing 
policy voluntarily. Their technology transfer offices could agree to implement GHI licensing practices. At 
the University of Pittsburgh,  for  instance,  the head of  the Office of Technology Management  has  this 
decision making capability.  Though, he would probably also require the support of the chancellor if the 
policy negatively impacted the university’s ability to sell licenses.lxxi Depending on how the GHI standards 
are set, the policy might not negatively impact the sale of university licenses. At least it is worth carrying  
out the requisite econometric analysis to determine the likely impact on all of the relevant stake-holders 
(including universities and the poor).
Technology transfer offices already use some non-financial criteria when deciding to whom to 
license  their  products.  The Bayh-Dole  act  encourages  universities  to  license  to  small,  US companies. 
Universities acquiesce without complaint. 
If  the  technology  transfer  offices  at  some  universities  are  reluctant  to  sign  on  to  voluntary 
programs,  however,  professors  and researchers  might  have an impact  because  they sign agreements  to 
allow universities  to  license patents  resulting from research  they create.  Although some researchers  at 
major  universities  receive  industry  funding,  only  7% of  university  research  is  funded  by  industry. lxxii 
Pharmaceutical funding probably makes up only a portion of the total.lxxiii
Universities might be receptive to the idea since: 
…universities hold an avowed commitment to creating and disseminating knowledge for 
the public good, and they have pledged to see the technologies they develop deployed to 
benefit the world. Campus decision makers are insulated from lobbies that may dominate 
political  arenas;  they are expected to be responsive to students and faculty;  and they 
operate  in  an  environment  where  reasoned  debate,  not  power,  is  expected  to  be  the 
currency.lxxiv
As the Association of University Technology Managers put it, universities are not only concerned about 
monetary benefits but want the new drugs and technologies they develop to “be used to further the public  
good.”lxxv
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Students could also encourage professors and universities to make the necessary revisions. They 
might  follow  United  Students  against  Sweat  Shops’  (USAS’)  example.  USAS  has  helped  convince 
campuses  to  buy “sweat-free”  clothing made at  factories  approved by the Worker  Rights  Consortium. 
Alternately,  students  might  emulate  Universities  Allied  for  Access  to  Essential  Medicines  (UAEM).  
UAEM has convinced universities to adopt Equitable Access (i.e. open access) licensing policies. lxxvi If a 
GHI licensing campaign was only as successful as USAS’s campaign has been so far, this proposal could 
create  840 million dollars  worth of  incentive  for  pharmaceutical  companies  to  become certified  every 
year.lxxvii That is about the cost of developing a new drug on the highest estimates. lxxviii This incentive might 
suffice to double the number of drugs produced for neglected diseases between in 1975-1999 in a similar 
time-frame.lxxix
V. Advantages of the GHI Proposals
GHI labeling and licensing have some advantages over and avoid some of the problems with the 
main alternatives. One advantage is that it might both help the poor access existing drugs and technologies  
and encourage new R&D for the poor. Most of the alternatives address only one of these problems. 
Consider, first, just a few alternatives to help the poor access existing drugs and technologies. It is  
impossible to canvass every proposal in the literature here. lxxx There are many innovative licensing and 
intellectual property strategies not discussed below that merit serious consideration, for instance. lxxxi One 
way of lowering the cost of existing drugs and technologies is via differential pricing. lxxxii Biotechnology 
and  pharmaceutical  companies  might  offer  drugs  at  different  prices  for  different  markets. lxxxiii Another 
option  is  compulsory  licensing.  Countries  can  issue  licenses  to  produce  and/or  import  these  products 
without approval by the company holding the patent. Yet a third way of lowering the cost of existing drugs  
and technologies is to repeal the World Trade Organization’s Trade Related Intellectual Property Rights 
Agreement (TRIPS) or, barring that, modify it to allow poor people to secure essential medicines at or 
below the marginal costs of production.lxxxiv
Although companies do some differential pricing, they have also resisted differential pricing. lxxxv 
In some cases, companies may suffer financially if they lower their prices for the poor. It may be hard to  
prevent re-importation of cheaper versions of identical-drugs across borders, even with different packaging. 
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So, it is not likely that companies will pursue differential pricing to the extent required to protect global  
health.
Similarly, companies often resist compulsory licensing. When South Africa passed its Medicines 
Act, many of the big pharmaceutical companies sued because the act encouraged generic competition for 
AIDS medicines.lxxxvi It was only after protracted negotiations, and a great deal of negative media attention, 
that the pharmaceutical companies withdrew their lawsuit. South Africa did not go on to import generic  
AIDS medicines.lxxxvii At the behest of companies, other countries have been singled out in the 301 Reports 
of the US Trade Representative for not being aggressive enough in enforcing foreign intellectual property 
rights  and  have,  thus,  faced  the  threat  of  trade  sanctions.lxxxviii The  US  has  also  used  bilateral  trade 
agreements and “diplomatic and political pressures to undermine countries that produce generic medicines 
and/or consider importing them.”lxxxix
Worse countries without their own manufacturing capacity may not be able to secure the drugs  
they need even if they do issue compulsory licenses.xc TRIPS requires countries like India,  Brazil, and 
Thailand that export essential drugs and technologies to issue compulsory licenses to do so. xci So far, only 
one country (Canada) has agreed to export drugs under a compulsory license.xcii It  issued a compulsory 
license  to  export  TRIPVAR,  an  AIDS  medication,  to  Rwanda.xciii Though,  given  the  complexity  of 
international  and  Canadian  law,  Canada  was  yet  to  export  a  single  pill  three  years  after  issuing  the 
license.xciv
Finally,  there  was  a  large  social  movement,  backed  even  by  the  (then)  Pope,  to  prevent 
implementation  of  the  TRIPS  agreement.xcv Ultimately,  it  failed.xcvi Biotechnology  and  pharmaceutical 
companies want control over the drugs they develop in every market. So it is unlikely that there will be a 
return to the pre-TRIPS situation or even that the agreement will be modified substantially to reduce prices  
in poor countries.xcvii 
Alternatives  to  GHI  that  encourage  R&D  on  essential  drugs  and  medications  for  neglected 
diseases include prize funds and grants.xcviii Agencies or individuals often agree to buy a certain number of 
doses from any company that develops a malaria vaccine at a set price. Foundations often give grants for  
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research  on neglected  diseases.xcix The  Gates’  Foundations recently partnered  with Novartis  to  support 
testing of new antibiotics for TB, for instance.c
Neither  alternative takes  full  advantage  of  the efficiency the free market  offers.  The agencies 
offering prize funds or grants have to decide what neglected diseases or problems they want to address and 
there may be better ways to help the poor. They also have to decide how much a given intervention is 
worth. “These decisions are likely to be associated with substantial inefficiencies due to incompetence, 
corruption, lobbying by companies and patient groups, and gaming.”ci 
Adian Hollis’ and Thomas Pogge’s alternative is to create a second (voluntary) patent system. cii 
Under this system, biotechnology and pharmaceutical companies would not be given a limited monopoly 
for their inventions. Rather, inventors would be rewarded based on how much their inventions contribute to 
ameliorating  the  GBD.  Inventors  would  have  an  incentive  to  invest  in  whatever  R&D,  infrastructure 
improvements, pricing systems, or donation programs would make the most impact on the GBD. They 
might even price their drugs below the marginal costs of production to capture a greater reward from this  
alternative patent scheme. The scheme would give inventors an incentive to collaborate with, rather than 
protest against,  generic companies,  country governments,  and non-governmental  organizations trying to 
alleviate the GBD. If the design details are properly worked out, Hollis’ and Pogge’s patent system would 
not create an incentive for companies to prefer drugs that treat the chronic diseases or disorders of affluent  
patients. Rather, companies would have an incentive to invest in those drugs that prevent the most death 
and alleviate the most suffering. In earlier work, Pogge said that the “cost of the plan might peak at around 
$45-$90 billion. With all the world’s countries participating, $45 billion amounts to 0.1 percent and $90 
billion to  0.2 percent  of  the global  product.”ciii In  the proposal  developed with Hollis,  they advance  a 
revised estimate of $6 billion.civ
Unfortunately,  Hollis  and  Pogge’s  proposal  may  also  have  a  few  problems. cv First,  not  all 
reductions in the GBD are due to an inventor’s efforts. Although a new drug or investment in infrastructure 
might help ameliorate a disease, things non-governmental organizations or other country governments are 
doing, independent of the investor, may contribute more. It is not clear that Hollis and Pogge are concerned 
to prevent investors from receiving undue credit and investors have incentive to claim credit where it is not 
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due. Second, Hollis and Pogge’s current proposal relies on collecting a lot of  new data by, for instance, 
funding expensive clinical trials. They also want an accurate estimate of impact as they plan to reward  
companies in proportion to their impact on the global disease burden. The necessary data is expensive and 
hard to collect.cvi Finally,  their  proposal  is  quite expensive and depends on the goodwill  of developed 
country taxpayers or donors who have historically done little to help the global poor.cvii Unless it is well 
funded, it will not generate a large enough incentive for companies to risk investing in new drugs and 
technologies.
This paper’s proposal avoids some of the problems sketched above. First, many biotechnology and 
pharmaceutical  companies  have  an  incentive  to  support  the  GHI  proposals  while  almost  (if  not)  all  
companies lack the incentive to do enough differential pricing, and almost all have an incentive to resist  
compulsory licensing and a return to the pre-TRIPS situation. Second, GHI takes full advantage of the free-
market’s efficiency. A GHI rating agency need not decide what diseases or problems companies should 
address, nor need it determine how much inventions are worth before they are created.cviii Rather, a GHI 
rating agency would reward companies based on how much their inventions and investments actually help 
the poor. Third, the GHI rating system is output based and could be used to incentivize companies to not 
only do R&D on neglected diseases but to extend access on existing drugs and technologies to the poor.  
Fourth,  it  does  not  benefit  companies  that  do not  help the  poor.  It  is  supposed  to  capture  only what  
companies have already done. The way this paper proposes to evaluate companies’ R&D, for instance, is 
by looking at what their drugs can do. It does not suggest collecting expensive new data or estimating the  
GBD.cix Furthermore, it only aims to rank companies ordinally and provide a constantly raising bar for 
companies to try to exceed. So it is much less data-intensive than Hollis and Pogge’s alternative. Fifth,  
although the proposal is not as ambitious as Hollis’ and Pogge’s, it has the advantage of being practical and 
relatively low cost. Although it will cost something to administer a trademark like GHI, those costs are  
nowhere near US $45-90 billion (or even US $6 billion).cx The total revenue and support for Transfair 
USA, the primary Fair Trade labeling organization in the US, was US $5,570,933 in 2006.cxi So, unlike 
Hollis’ and Pogge’s proposal, this one would not require taxpayer support. It could even be developed in 
poor countries.
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Finally, the case for GHI labeling and licensing campaigns does not depend on showing that they 
are better than the alternatives or establishing a hierarchy between them. The GHI proposal sketched above 
does not compete with any of the other proposals on the table. Rather, it can be used in conjunction with all 
of the alternatives to bring even greater benefits to the poor.
VI. Objections
Even if this paper’s proposal has some advantages over some of the main competitors, it may not 
be a good idea to pursue it. Perhaps there are better things biotechnology and pharmaceutical companies,  
universities, researchers, students, and consumers could do. Poor people’s greatest health problems cannot  
be solved by better access to existing drugs and technologies or more R&D on diseases affecting the poor. 
War,  natural  disasters,  dirty  water,  and  inadequate  food  provide  the  biggest  obstacles  to  health  in  
developing countries. Prevention and poverty alleviation could do much more for the poor than pills. Some 
anti-retrovirals, for instance, do little for the poor in parts of the world where people lack adequate nutrition 
without which the drugs are often ineffective.
It is impossible to decide whether there are better things agencies or individuals could do besides  
supporting GHI in biotechnology and pharmaceutical companies a priori. New vaccines against typhoid,  
cholera, and malaria or better access to antibiotics might do as much for the poor as vitamin A supplements  
or a few more wells. GHI might lead companies to come up with new anti-retrovirals or treatment regimes 
that work in the poorest places. Even if there are other things that could, in principle, benefit the poor more, 
there may be room for those with different interests and talents to take different approaches to ameliorating 
poverty. It is also possible to support GHI and provide food, vitamin supplements, and wells. 
A more pressing objection is that, if a GHI rating system is put in place,  highly rated companies 
might try to distract the public from their generally poor behaviour in other arenas. Suppose, for instance,  
that another organization launched a campaign to get companies to stop fighting compulsory-licensing in 
developing countries by lobbying US trade-representatives. Companies might respond by holding a media 
event to promote their GHI status and undermine the campaign. Since companies control a lot of resources,  
they would probably win a battle in the press.
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Companies  hardly  need  a  label,  however,  to  hold  a  public  relations  event  and  undermine 
campaigns to get them to improve their practices. Companies can promote their charitable programs, or 
even  start  new programs  to  get  good  publicity.  Those  involved  in  the  attempt  to  get  pharmaceutical 
companies to improve their practices should not blame each other if companies abuse their efforts. Rather,  
they should stand together –the GHI review panel might even create standards for reducing companies’  
high ratings if  they find new ways  of acting poorly.  Although a rating system for pharmaceutical  and 
biotechnology  companies  will  not  solve  all  the  poor’s  health  problems,  they  may make  a  significant 
difference in many people’s lives.
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